The United States, since its founding, always has placed some focus on the idea of promoting human rights abroad, but much major policy action on the issue came in four waves during the 20th century. Woodrow Wilson's ideas following WWI, the creation of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the 1940s, Congressional actions reinforced and expanded by President Jimmy Carter's administration in the 1970s, and President Bill Clinton's policies following the end of the Cold War each developed and institutionalized particular human rights policies. Viewed collectively, the waves had similar underling triggers:
all followed major shifts in the international environment that allowed talk of significant policy shifts, all came during Democratic administrations in which the President's personal commitment led to elevated rhetoric on human rights, and all saw the appointment of human rights supporters into key foreign policy positions. The waves also were similar in being relatively short-lived with some policies reversed by future administrations and many more simply losing momentum to become less central to policy considerations.
During the periods of retrenchment, human rights advocates often lamented the policy limits of the particular moment with a sense that, if they could only be free of these era-specific problems, they could fully implement a human rights driven foreign policy. The recurring nature of the retrenchments, though, shows that the limits were, in fact, not short-term era-specific problems, but rather structural constraints generated by the international and domestic political systems. Four key restraints were 1) practical limits on U.S. power over other countries' domestic actions, 2) competing U.S. policy priorities, 3) a U.S. hesitance to join multilateral institutions, and 4) the continued domestic political weakness of human rights advocates (Dietrich 2006) . Still, the retrenchment periods never completely reversed the gains made, with Wilsonianism outliving Wilson, the Carter era State Department Human Rights Bureau remaining after Carter, and so on. Overall, as Sikkink has argued, specific policies adopted in one period became so entrenched in time that they became ongoing parts of the country's identity (Sikkink 2004 ). This means that, over the century, U.S. human rights policy has been a situation of "two steps forward one step back," but with a net forwards trajectory. Human rights goals are a much larger component of modern U.S. foreign policy than realist scholars and some practitioners in the vein of George Kennan or Henry Kissinger would have expected or wished. At the same time, those expecting or hoping for a U.S. policy driven purely by human rights considerations will always be disappointed and, in their frustration over setbacks, may not fully note the progress that is made.
In his 2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama stressed the theme of "Change." One arena in which many expected change from the George W. Bush administration was human rights policy. Based on his campaign and the patterns from previous periods, it was predictable that Obama would introduce new human rights initiatives, but it was equally predictable that many of those initiatives would be affected by structural limitations and therefore end up only partially implemented. The steps forward were important, but were somewhat overshadowed by steps sideways or backwards. In turn, many in the human rights community became disappointed and frustrated (Roth 2010; Jost 2009 ) while other commentators used the failures as further proof that the United States is never serious about action on human rights (Jost 2009 ; The
Arena 2009).
Two plus years into his administration, it is apparent that the past patterns indeed have repeated thus confirming both the importance of variables predicting new initiatives and the continued influence of structural constraints. Even with constraints, though, the Obama administration has advanced U.S. human rights policies sufficiently in half-dozen key areas to say that a fifth wave of human rights policy development is underway. Three of those areasrecognition of international law and institutions, policies on detainees in the War on Terror, and democracy promotion-show modifications of Bush policies. The other three-protections for new societal groups, engagement, and justification of forceful protection of civilians-show Obama's own modern stamp on new issues or ones revived from the 1990s.
To see how the overall wave patterns have repeated and to examine the specifics of Obama's policies, it is important to explore more carefully what factors suggested Obama did have a moment of opportunity for policy change, what changes he was able to bring, but also how his policies continued to be constrained by structural factors.
Reacting to The Bush Legacy
Before examining Obama's actions, it should be noted that history is not a perfect circle, so each human rights wave forward will be affected by the events preceding it. The Bush administration's legacy included both specific policies in key areas and overall policy dynamics that ran across policy areas.
In his two terms, Bush took some actions that were praised by human rights supporters.
For example, his administration played a role in ending the North-South civil war in Sudan, he pressed several countries and the U.S. bureaucracy to pay more attention to religious rights, and he led a massive expansion of U.S. programs to combat international HIV/AIDS. On the other hand, his administration's positions in regards to international law and institutions, actions allowable in the War on Terror, and second tier justifications of the Afghan and Iraq wars as proper uses of force to bring democracy claimed the most attention.
Bush's policies have been extensively examined and analyzed (Mertus 2003; Roth 204; Forsythe 2008 ), but some key actions on international law include that Bush and his advisors argued that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to those captured in the War on Terror and held at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp. They employed a broad reading of the Convention Against Torture to allow tough, and in many eyes illegal, interrogations. For the Iraq War, they stretched the previous international law understanding of the conditions that justify preemptive military action. In regard to international human rights institutions, Bush unsigned the treaty that established the International Criminal Court (ICC), led sharp criticism of the court, and signed new U.S. laws allowing the use of force to free Americans brought before the ICC and denying foreign aid to countries that refused to sign commitments saying that they would not extradite Americans to the court. Bush's intense hostility to the court softened somewhat over time as the United States did not veto a UN Security Council resolution referring the situation in Darfur, Sudan for ICC investigation. The administration was more consistently hostile to the new United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) being one of only seven countries that opposed the UNHRC's draft resolution on working rules, refusing to run for a seat on the council, and repeatedly questioning its effectiveness and apparent bias against Israel.
In the War on Terror, Bush took several positions that were sharply questioned by human rights supporters. The United States established the Guantanamo Bay detention camp as well as one at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. Bush argued that his executive authority allowed him to hold prisoners indefinitely and to set up military tribunals for suspects. Over time, the detentions and tribunal arrangements were repeatedly challenged in the courts, but the administration stuck to as tough a set of policies as possible under the law and continued to defend sweeping powers for the executive. The United States also employed extraordinary rendition to capture suspects and take them to secret CIA prisons around the world or deliver them to countries believed to practice torture. Domestically, the administration supported procedures under the Patriot Act and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that many civil liberties experts argued were violations of civil rights in the name of security.
Bush also made the spreading of democracy one of his central goals. At first glance, this would seem to be in line with the goals of the human rights community, but for years some human rights advocates had argued that too large a focus on creating institutions of democracy such as elections might crowd out efforts on broader human rights objectives such as civil liberties and equality. Furthermore, it could allow regimes to paper over abuses in one area with concessions in another (Donnelly 1999; McFaul 2005) . Additionally, Bush's democracy promotion came to be associated with the use of force in Iraq and Afghanistan. The policies also came with a sense that new democracies were expected to adopt a U.S. vision of proper democratic institutions and other policies. As Bush's policies evolved, they came to be criticized by many democratic allies as well as human rights advocates in the United States. As aptly described by democracy scholar Thomas Carothers, democracy promotion had become "radioactive" because of Bush administration policies (2009).
Bush's actions in these three areas and others of less prominence also changed some overall policy dynamics. Under Bush, the United States lost its traditional leadership role in the international human rights movement. This shift had major implications for human rights globally because U.S. power and moral authority has always meant that its actions, or inactions, have disproportionate influence around the world. Without challenges led by the United States, authoritarian states find it easier to crack down on domestic dissidents. Russia, China and others who often stress sovereignty over human rights can more easily block actions in the U.N. Security Council and other multilateral forums. A European Council on Foreign Relations study found that, at the end of the Bush era, Russia and China got over 75 percent backing for their positions in the U.N. General Assembly (Gowan and Brantner 2008) . Additionally, the UNHRC produced few dramatic criticisms of countries other than Israel. As one leading U.S. legal scholar summed it up near the end of Bush's term, the United States "has been the balance wheel of the system for the last 60 years, but has not been for the last seven years. If the U.S. is not the balance wheel, there is no balance wheel" (Mendelson 2009 ). The decline of U.S. leadership also has an impact on the country's ability to achieve a wide range of international goals because U.S. moral leadership has always been an important component of its "soft power" used to shape alliances and global actions (Shattuck 2008) . In this regard, it is noteworthy that in a 2006 poll, significant majorities in both Germany and Great Britain felt the United States was "doing a bad job" on "advancing human rights in other countries" (World 2006).
As Obama took office, essays and comments by many human rights supporters began with the necessity of bringing the United States back to its leadership position (Schultz 2008) .
This was also a theme that Obama stressed during the campaign. As he accepted the Democratic nomination in August 2008, he spoke of the need to "restore our moral standing" and to "build new partnerships to defeat the threats of the 21 st century" (Obama 2008) . In many ways, Obama was saying he would bring the country back to where it was ten years ago on international law and institutions, so the statements and actions were not bold advances of human rights policy, but they should not be dismissed or underappreciated since one cannot hope to climb a mountain if one is trapped in a hole.
Bush era policies also drew more focus to U.S. domestic actions on human rights as opposed to its actions promoting human rights abroad. This is not a brand new phenomenon.
For example, the U.S. ability to push human rights goals in the 1940s and 1950s was complicated by continuing racial discrimination at home. Recently, the United States has drawn some criticism for domestic policies such as capital punishment (Human Rights Watch 1999).
Generally, though, the United States has been able to focus abroad and make tough statements on violations because its own house was in order. Bush Protection at the NSC.
Collectively, this group is very well known and respected in the NGO and academic communities. This should give some NGOs better access to the executive bureaucracy than they had under Bush. Many of these key players had previous experience in Bill Clinton's administration or elsewhere in Washington, so they have personal relationships with each other and with senior administration officials.
There was thus the combination of a historic moment, a Democratic administration, a committed president and experienced top advisors. Given the small number of previous waves, it is impossible to determine definitively how many of these conditions are necessary for policy McCain on through to a liberal and antiwar Democrat like Howard Dean, you likely would see more efforts to change policy on international law, War on Terror detentions, and how to promote democracy. To actually achieve change requires commitment, but also compromise and pragmatism, so Obama may well have been the type of person who could provide the strongest momentum to move U.S. human rights policy forward into a fifth wave.
Obama's Steps Forward
Upon taking office, Obama was in a position to develop new policies and there was action on a number of fronts.
Joining International Treaties and Institutions
Obama is a strong believer in the rule of law and international treaties. He also supports actions through multilateral institutions. These views, coupled with the desire to reverse Bush administration hostility to certain international treaties and institutions, led Obama to renew focus on several human rights treaties and to advance U.S. participation in the key institutions of showed his personal connection to the issue with reference to his father-in-law Fraser Robinson who continued to work despite suffering from multiple sclerosis.
Importantly, despite Obama's statements on each of the treaties and Democratic control of the Senate, the administration did not submit any of the treaties to the Senate. In part, this reflects the administration's focus on pushing several domestic issues through Congress, but it also reflects that the treaties were far from assured of victory in the Senate given fierce It was critical of the council's Goldstone report on Israeli actions in Gaza and worked to block punishments based on the report; a position that gained more credibility when Goldstone himself later repudiated some of the report's central findings. Still, the administration argued that simply being at the council made a practical difference in several outcomes and was an important symbolic move in reestablishing U.S. human rights leadership. The administration therefore announced it would seek another term on the Council.
The United States also submitted its first report on its own human rights policies under a Universal Periodic Reviews (UPR) system that requires all countries to report their activities to the UNHCR. The report gave the administration a chance to consider its policies and to meet with civil society groups to gain their perspectives. The final report touted the administration's new policies on terrorist detainees and torture, but also acknowledged problems such as continuing gaps in achievement between U.S. racial groups and controversial new policies such as Arizona's immigration laws. In January 2011, the UN released a review of the U.S.
submission that included 228 recommendations for the United States to improve. In March 2011, the United States responded that it supported 174 of the recommendations in whole or in part ranging from civil rights to immigration to torture, but that there also were areas where the United States disagreed, for example on maintaining the death penalty. Human Rights First's Gabor Rona expressed the widely held view that "The United States' approach to the UPR will help strengthen compliance with human rights norms here at home and will encourage a high standard for reporting by other countries," and "strengthen the integrity of the Council's credibility as a human rights monitoring body" (Human Rights First 2011).
Obama also has moved the United States to a more active position in ICC planning.
Bush moved from outright hostility to grudging acceptance, but Obama officials have gone further to "reset the default on the U.S. relationship with the court from hostility to positive engagement" (Koh and Rapp 2010) . Many officials in the administration hold the belief, shaped in many cases by personal experiences, that international courts can be effective. They also note that the ICC is now established with more than 100 members and is unlikely to disappear, so it is important to shape the court as much as possible. The United States therefore sent a delegation as an observer nation to the ICC review conference held in Kampala, Uganda in July 2010.
The United States is not the usual observer nation; it was active throughout the week in a number of meetings focused on particular countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and on planning future ICC actions. Crucially, there was much discussion of defining the crime of aggression. ICC members had been working on the issue for years and a consensus appeared to be emerging out of working group meetings. The administration concluded the emerging definition was too vague and did not have proper oversight, so could lead the court into fruitless efforts to try multiple countries. The U.S. delegation at Kampala therefore worked to clarify terminology, to give the U.N. Security Council a leading role either in referring cases of aggression to the court or being able to block investigations, and to require that any definition of aggression not become operational unless it was approved by two-thirds of countries at a review conference held no earlier than 2017. The agreements also stipulated that no U.S. national could be prosecuted for aggression as long as the U.S. remains a non-state party.
The United States also took a step toward cooperation with ICC when it voted in favor of The fourth group were those who could be transferred safely to another country for detention and rehabilitation. Releasing prisoners outright or transferring them to local detention from where they could be released became difficult with rising reports that former detainees were returning to terrorist groups in Yemen and elsewhere. Sending the prisoners home also was difficult as some feared persecution in their own countries. For example, several Algerian detainees argued that they would prefer to remain in U.S. custody rather than face persecution by the Algerian government or radical groups. The administration responded that its overall review of policies had led to new guidelines for safe transfers and that in this case Algeria had made progress in human rights practices and given "diplomatic assurances" that the men would be safe. In the case of Uighur detainees who feared returning to China, several third countries accepted former detainees, but other detainees sought court action to allow them to settle in the United States.
The last were those who could not be prosecuted, but who posed a danger to the American people. Under Bush, such detentions were defended as necessary presidential power in a time of war. In March 2009, the Obama administration lawyers gave federal judge John D.
Bates a more modest argument for the same actions. They argued that under the authorization granted by Congress to use force against those involved in the 9/11 attacks, the president could detain people that were part of al Qaeda or its affiliates, or were substantial supporters (Savage 2010 ). This decision did not fully clarify how substantial or direct support needed to be, so debate continued over the long-term policy. Obama's position acknowledged a role of the courts and Congress in determining when to hold these prisoners. As Steve Vladek has noted, the outcome of detainees held indefinitely without trial was the same as under Bush, but at least now the legal arguments and process of decision had moved away from unlimited executive power (The Obama Administration 2011). Finally, there was the challenge of finding a facility to house these high level detainees and others awaiting trial. Several locations in the United States were raised as possibilities, but Congress blocked the funding necessary to establish the new facilities.
Looking across the five categories and what they show for future detainees, the ACLU concluded "that the administration has taken positive steps and made genuine progress in some areas" but often "a significant achievement was followed by a step back" (ACLU 2010). This highlights the underlying argument that human rights moves rarely are total victories because they are limited by international and domestic constraints. It also shows that it can be much harder to dismantle or otherwise alter existing policies than it was to create the policies in the first place.
A second major action taken in the War on Terror category also began with a January 22, from the world, endangered captured U.S. soldiers who might face retaliation and actually served as a recruitment tool for al Qaeda rather than dismantling the terrorist network.
Obama's moves on torture cannot be considered groundbreaking since they return the United States to its pre-9/11 position, but they are still important. The administration, though, has disappointed some human rights advocates by arguing that, in the interests of looking forward not backward, there should be no special investigations of those who authorized techniques in the Bush administration or compensation for victims. Not pursuing full accountability makes political sense since it might alienate Republicans that Obama needs on other issues, but it is counter to what the administration has supported for other countries.
Shifting Focus on Democracy Promotion
As noted earlier, Obama faced a dilemma on democracy promotion because he felt it should be an important component of U.S. policy, but Bush era rhetoric and policies had tainted the concept in many eyes. In his first years, Obama tried to resolve the dilemma by sharply changing U.S. rhetoric on democracy and somewhat modifying U.S. policies.
The Obama administration intentionally did not stress democracy promotion as its leading goal. Still, Obama gave a number of speeches that touched on the importance of democracy. In all of the mostly closely watched speeches, he stressed the idea that each country must determine its own political path, that democracy will spread over time, and that democracy is good for the world's people. In Egypt in 2009, he noted, "America does not presume to know what is best for everyone, just as we would not presume to pick the outcome of a peaceful election" (Obama 2009c ). Clearly these comments aimed to soothe Muslim states' worries that the United States expected Western style democracy and to acknowledge that, in the past, the United States was less supportive of democracy in Palestine and elsewhere if radical, antiAmerican groups were elected. In Ghana in 2009, he told wary African leaders that "the essential truth of democracy is that each nation determines its own destiny" (Obama 2009a) . At the United Nations, he noted, "Each society must search its own path, and no path is perfect.
Each country must pursue a path rooted in the culture of its people and in its past traditions" (Obama 2009d ). Obama usually followed up these comments with the argument that the main principles of democracy are universal. This suggests that in the end democracy will spread, but at its own pace and form. All of these statements are considerably more open to local variation and more humble sounding than most heard during the Bush administration.
Obama's speeches also include the arguments that democracy is good for countries because it supports individual freedom, good societies, and stable governments. He notes that democracies make good trade partners and allies, but his prime focus remains on how democracy aids the local society. This is different from Bush, who often argued for the security gains from spreading democracy. In his Second Inaugural Address, Bush argued that Middle East democracy would lessen terrorism and unrest and that " [t] he survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world" (Bush 2005 ). Obama's arguments make rapid democracy spreading less of a necessity and downplay U.S. gains, so democracy promotion can logically be just one part of an overall human rights strategy, as opposed to the driving force it was in the Bush period.
On policy mechanisms, Obama's speeches further stress that "America will not seek to impose any system of government on any other nation" (Obama 2009a) . He also noted before his inauguration that democracy promotion should be viewed "though a lens that is actually delivering a better life for people on the ground and less obsessed with form, more concerned with substance." (Baker 2009 ). In speeches and the main State Department documents on democracy promotion such as the Advancing Freedom and Democracy Reports the administration set out five main elements of their approach:
demonstrating our own commitment to human rights by practicing what we preach; principled engagement with other governments aimed not just at making a point, but at making a difference; outreach to civil society groups and individuals working for positive change within their own countries; support for a broad array of accountability and transparency mechanisms in political and economic spheres; and engaging multilateral institutions at both the global and regional levels (Advancing Freedom 2010)
In fact, many of these policies are not all that different from Bush administration policies, which were often caricatured as centered on bringing democracy through the barrel of a gun, but were much more complex and varied. This also means, though, that accusations that Obama has abandoned democracy promotion ring hollow.
The administration has put particular focus on developing civil society as a means to democratic development. Speaking to the Community of Democracies in 2010, Secretary
Clinton spoke strongly against governments around the world that are "slowly crushing civil society and the human spirit" singling out Cuba, North Korea, Iran, but also Russia and China (Clinton 2010a legitimacy, but the Arab Spring also highlights the point, to be developed further later, that many human rights events around the world, both good and bad, happen more because of local politics than any actions taken by the United States.
Focusing on New Areas
Although some goals of U.S. human rights policy have been fairly consistent over time Clinton also has worked to avoid having women's issues separated from traditional security concerns. At the United Nations, she argued that including women in politics and peacemaking "is not doing a favor for ourselves and them by including women in the work of peace. This is a necessary global security imperative, including women in the work of peace advances our national security interests, promotes political stability, economic growth, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" (Clinton 2010c) . Similar language was included in Obama's National Security Strategy. Clinton showed the connections of women's issues and security in policy to Afghanistan. In the summer of 2010, there was concern in Afghanistan and abroad that women were not playing a major part in planning the country's future and that the security policy of establishing stability by negotiating with the Taliban might lead to major reversals in women's rights. Clinton raised the issues repeatedly with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. In July 2010, she told a conference of foreign ministers that women in the country "will not be sacrificed" in pursuit of stability and pushed for language in a final meeting communiqué that recognized "the centrality of women's rights to the future of Afghanistan" (Boone 2010 ).
The Obama administration also has been active promoting LGBT rights with Clinton modifying her phrasing to "human rights are gay rights and gay rights are human rights" (Clinton 2010b ). Some actions on the issue have been domestic, with Obama supporting an end to the U.S. military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy and increased medical access for gay partners.
Global focus on LGBT rights is relatively new and remains controversial. In 2008, the United
Nations considered a proposed resolution that would have affirmed equal rights for all and said that countries should not have laws that make sexual orientation or gender identity a basis for criminal penalties, detention, or executions. Due to opposition from Arab League members, the resolution was not adopted, but a statement with the same wording was opened for signature. LGBT people" and part of a global shift in norms" (Briefing on LGBT 2011)
The administration has been sharply critical of countries with anti-gay laws, but this has in some cases showed how divided the U.S. NGO community is on the issue. In 2009, three
American evangelical Christians traveled to Uganda to speak on their view that homosexuality is counter to the Bible and to African family values, and to discuss how gay people could be made straight. The next year, a Ugandan politician claiming ties to friends in the American government and elsewhere introduced a new law to impose a death sentence for homosexual behavior. Obama termed the new law "odious" and the United States and others threatened to cut off aid to Uganda (Obama Condemns 2010) . Subsequently, the draft law was modified to a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, but the debate, and to some degree, the question of who speaks for the United States on the issue will recur in Uganda and elsewhere.
Using Engagement
During the campaign and early in his administration, Obama repeatedly spoke about the importance of engaging countries in the hopes of settling disagreements and inducing better behavior on global issues. On human rights, this went along with his view that:
"The promotion of human rights cannot be about exhortation alone. At times, it must be coupled with painstaking diplomacy. I know that engagement with repressive regimes lacks the satisfying purity of indignation. But I also know that sanctions without outreach --condemnation without discussion --can carry forward only a crippling status quo." (Obama 2009d ).
This policy was seen in calls to "reset" U.S. During the meetings, U.S. officials raised general concerns about the importance of political dialogue within Burma based on free speech and assembly, encouraged the regime to release political prisoners, and promoted new policies for ethnic minorities. They put particular focus on steps needed to make Burma's scheduled fall 2010 elections credible. In November 2009, after their first visit to Burma, Marciel and others were quite frank in admitting that they faced a difficult challenge and that they did not know whether their talks would lead the Burmese to change. Therefore, they noted that the policy would not continue unless there was real progress (Marciel 2009 ).
Less than one year into the new policy and after a second trip to Burma, Campbell announced "profound disappointment in what we have witnessed to date" (Campbell 2010a) . He noted that a number of regime actions meant the elections would lack international legitimacy.
Political prisoners had not been released, instead the leading opposition figure Aung San Suu
Kyi had had her sentence extended and prisoners had been dispersed to remote locations around the country. In seeking stability, the regime had increased pressure on ethnic minorities, leading many people to flee their homes. By September 2010, Campbell was still urging patience with the policy, but noted, "in our assessments of our engagement strategy to date . . . I think the benefits have been quite limited" (Campbell 2010b ). The United States sharply criticized the flawed 2010 elections, but days later welcomed Aung San Suu Kyi's release from house arrest.
There was also some progress in Spring 2011 when a new civilian government was formed, but it was unclear whether real change would continue and whether U.S. engagement was at all responsible for the changes being made.
Justification of Forceful Protection of Civilians
The events in Libya in the Spring of 2011 provided Obama with an opportunity to establish new ideas about when the United States should militarily intervene to prevent human rights abuses. This issue was central to the foreign policy of the 1990s when the United States considered action in Somalia, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Haiti and elsewhere, but for almost a decade interventions tied to the War on Terror had dominated U.S. military focus. In the meantime, the United Nations had developed and adopted in 2005 a new formulation namely that states have a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) their citizens from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. In cases where the state was not fulfilling this responsibility, the international community must use measures including force to protect the citizens. This formulation meant that intervention could more easily be justified against a sovereign state, and possibly that it would be more accepted by traditionally strong supporters of sovereignty such as Russia, China, and many African states. Obama was careful to stress that Libya presented an unusual combination of circumstances, so that policy there would not limit policy flexibility in dealing with Syria and others, but it still represented a real application of R2P against a sovereign state, so laid out some important markers.
The Libyan case shows three ways in which Obama set important limits on U.S. human rights intervention. First, Obama stated that, in cases where U.S. safety was not at stake, "our interests and our values" could be threatened enough to provide a responsibility to act, but he set the bar quite high for the specific circumstances necessary in those cases (Obama 2011 ).
Gaddafi's long-term dictatorship and human rights abuses earned mild criticism, his forceful crackdown on protestors earned condemnation and sanctions, but it was not until the city of Benghazi was in Obama's words, one day away from "a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world" that force was justified. Second, for Also important is that the Libyan actions explicitly used the R2P formulation. Resolution 1973, reiterates "the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population"
(emphasis added) and noted the Libyan government's failure to meet its responsibilities. It considers that a flight ban "constitutes an important element for the protection of civilians." In Obama's speech to the nation, he spoke of the "responsibility to act" and "our responsibilities to our fellow human beings" emphasis added (Obama 2011) . Gareth Evans, former Australian foreign minister and key advocate of R2P, commented that the U.N. actions gave "extraordinary new momentum and authority" to R2P and ushered in the implementation phase of developing a world without major human rights violations (Rieff 2011 ). The long-term impact of portraying Libya as a case of R2P depends in part on how events in Libya play out, but the very fact of justifying U.S. actions in those terms is an important development.
Continued Barriers to Action
Criticism that Obama has ignored human rights or taken no significant steps forward is unwarranted. On the other hand, some of his steps have been half steps--such as supporting U.N. treaties, but not getting ratification; trying, but failing to close Guantanamo; speaking about democracy in general, but not pushing it equally hard in all cases. Other active efforts have so far yielded few results--such as efforts to end gender discrimination and engagement efforts with Burma. His track record to date has led many human rights supporters to become frustrated. This is not surprising, particularly after the very high hopes and expectations at the start of the administration, but these feelings should not overwhelm recognition that positive steps have been taken or discount the impact of the four key factors that continue to limit U.S. human rights policies. United States should abandon its efforts, but it does mean that some policy failures must be expected and they should not always be perceived as a lack of effort or will.
A second limit on U.S. human rights actions is competing U.S. policy priorities.
Globally, human rights concerns are given more attention now than ever in world history, but this does not change the fact that countries, including the United States, will always rank security and economic priorities higher than human rights goals. This reality can be illustrated in a number of Obama's moves that considered human rights, but also sought to limit terrorist A third limit on U.S. human rights policy is continued U.S. hesitance to join multilateral institutions. There are few modern Americans that could be called true isolationists, but there are many in the public and government who strongly believe the United States is an exceptional country that should not bend to international opinion, as well as a country that holds the Constitution and domestically passed laws supreme above international treaties and law. The continued strength of these views can be seen in reactions to Obama's call for ratifying U.N.
treaties and in how much those reactions mirror reactions to earlier U.N. treaties. Treaty critics almost always begin by arguing that the particular treaty is unnecessary given existing good U.S.
behavior and that the treaty is weak because it has been ratified by other countries with worse human rights records. The critics then switch the argument and suggest that the treaty is so strong that it would bring nearly apocalyptic changes to the United States on this issue and eventually multiple other issues as well. This means the debate is not really about the particulars of the treaty; it is about whether it is un-American to ratify the treaty. Virtually the same debates are heard over whether to join particular international institutions. In time, the United States sometimes does shift position, for example ratifying the Genocide Convention after forty years, but, in the short-term, all human rights supporters can hope for is that the United States follow the spirit of the treaty or institution and that it not openly attack them as Given all these limits, it is not surprising that Obama's first years saw mixed results and it will not be surprising if this continues. Still, Obama has modified a number of Bush policies and accomplished enough on other issues to say that a fifth wave of human rights policy development is underway.
